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Abstract: We should distinguish between the apparent source of a norm and the 
scope of the norm’s satisfaction conditions. Wide-scope social norms need not be 
externalised, and externalised social norms need not be wide in scope. Attending to 
this distinction leads to a problem for Stanford: the adaptive advantages he 
attributes to externalised norms are actually advantages of wide-scope norms.  
 
 
Stanford has identified an important feature of our moral psychology: our tendency to 
regard moral norms as externally imposed demands rather than as shared subjective 
commitments. The motivational force of a moral norm appears to come ‘from 
outside’—from an external source—and this appearance of externality calls for 
explanation. He also argues, plausibly, that existing accounts of the evolution of 
morality do not explain this phenomenon of ‘moral externalisation’. His proposed 
explanation is that externalisation generates a link between the strength of an agent’s 
own motivation to comply with a norm and the strength of their normative 
expectation that others likewise comply—a link that helps maintain correlated 
interaction between prosocial individuals. Here is a problem for this proposal. 
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Stanford does not distinguish between the apparent source of a norm (i.e. Do I regard 
myself as making a subjective commitment to a norm, or do I regard it as something 
that is externally imposed on me?) and the scope of the norm’s satisfaction conditions 
(i.e. Do the satisfaction conditions of the norm pertain to my behaviour only, or to the 
whole community’s behaviour?). The apparent source and scope of a norm are 
separable: wide-scope social norms need not be externalised, and externalised social 
norms need not be wide in scope.  
 
To see the difference between the apparent source of a norm and its scope, consider 
the following two cases. On the one hand, an agent may have a subjective 
commitment to a norm that pertains to the behaviour of an entire community. 
Suppose, for example, I have a subjective commitment to the norm that everyone in 
my community should pick up litter. The norm is wide in scope (it applies to the 
behaviour of the whole community), yet I do not regard it as externally imposed: I 
regard it as a subjective commitment, the motivational force of which derives from 
my personal desire for clean streets. I like it when people adhere to the norm and 
dislike it when they violate the norm, but I do not regard these norm violations as 
transgressions of an externally imposed demand. On the other hand, an agent may 
externalize a norm that pertains solely to their own behaviour. Suppose, for example, 
the Pope regards certain norms as applying to himself alone qua Pope. These norms 
of Papal conduct have very narrow scope, and yet they may well be externalised: the 
Pope regards these norms not as subjective commitments, deriving their motivational 
force from his own personal desires, but as externally imposed Divine commands. 
 
The problem for Stanford’s argument is that the adaptive advantages he attributes to 
externalised social norms are actually advantages of wide-scope social norms. It is 
wide-scope social norms, not externalised social norms per se, that maintain 
correlated interaction between cooperators. For example, my subjective commitment 
to the litter-picking norm will motivate me to pick up litter myself, to monitor my 
neighbours’ litter-picking, to get upset when neighbours fail to pick up litter, to 
encourage my neighbours to pick up litter, and to prefer interacting with neighbours 
who pick up litter to neighbours who don't. If others share my subjective 
commitment, we will profitably cooperate; if they don’t, I will shun them. This 
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adaptive package of correlated interaction and profitable cooperation can arise 
without any externalisation of the norm, provided it is sufficiently wide in scope. 
Conversely, an externalised norm may fail to yield any significant correlated 
interaction if it is excessively narrow in scope. Norms that apply to a single 
individual, such as norms of Papal conduct, are a limiting case in which there is no 
correlated interaction at all. Once we distinguish between wide-scope norms and 
externalised norms, allowing the two properties to come apart, we see that it is the 
former property, not the latter, that leads to correlated interaction. 
 
The ability of wide-scope social norms to maintain cooperation across extended social 
networks suggests an important role for these norms in human social evolution. One 
can imagine a gradual expansion of the scope of social norms from the scale of the 
band to the scale of the wider kin-group, and from the scale of the kin-group to the 
scale of even larger ethnolinguistic groups. However, there would have been no need 
for these wide-scope norms to be perceived as externally imposed: shared subjective 
commitments would have yielded the same adaptive advantages. Externalisation is a 
separate phenomenon in need of a separate explanation. Although this is not the place 
to develop such an explanation, it is worth pointing out that Stanford’s article, 
surprisingly, makes no mention of religion. As the example of the Pope suggests, it 
may be that our tendency to externalise moral norms is a culturally evolved way of 
thinking entangled with the concept of a Divine enforcer. 
 
